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1. Introduction 
Chief Justice Roberts’ dissenting opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges1 contains two 
conflicting understandings of the Supreme Court’s source of legitimacy. The first, 
relying on The Federalist No. 78,2 positions “judgment” as the Court’s source of 
legitimacy;3 the second relies on a quote from an earlier judgment in which Justice 
Kennedy paraphrased The Federalist No. 78 and positions “public respect” as the 
Court’s source of legitimacy.4 In this article, I explain how these two readings of 
The Federalist No. 78 represent two distinct ways of understanding judicial 
legitimacy. According to the first, stating that the Supreme Court (hereinafter: the 
Court) has legitimacy means that its authority is justified by its expertise in law or 
in a related field such as human rights. According to the second, newer 
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1 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2611 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
2 Alexander Hamilton, “The Federalist No. 78,” The Federalist Papers, ed. Ian Shapiro (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 392. 
3 Obergefell, 2611 
4 Obergefell, 2624 
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understanding, judicial legitimacy means that public opinion polls demonstrate 
high levels of enduring public support for the Court. 
A hundred years ago, it would have been impossible to say that the Court has 
legitimacy because public opinion polls demonstrate high levels of enduring public 
support for the Court. This use of the concept of “judicial legitimacy,” now very 
common,5 would have been impossible to fathom before the invention of public 
opinion polls during the 1930s. It would still have been implausible to attribute 
such a meaning to judicial legitimacy until recent decades, when polling 
organizations started to measure public support for the Court. The more plausible 
interpretation, until recently, of the statement that “the Court has legitimacy” was 
that its authority or its judgments were justified in moral terms in a way that is 
unrelated to its public support.6 
Even before the invention of opinion polls, justices and scholars sometimes 
spoke of the Court’s source of legitimacy as emanating from “public confidence.”7 
Yet, in the absence of public opinion polls, their understanding of public opinion 
was very different to ours. The argument that I develop below is that public 
opinion was understood not as a simple aggregate of individual opinions but more 
as a diffused public state of mind expressed by institutions such as Congress.8 In 
any conflict between the Court and the elected branches, the President and 
Congress could always rely, based on the most recent elections, on their public 
                                           
 
5 For example, Jeffery Rosen argues the Court has a legitimacy problem based on “a New 
York Times/CBS poll [that] found that only 44 percent of Americans approve of the Supreme Court’s 
job performance.” See Jeffery Rosen, “The Supreme Court has a Legitimacy Crisis, But Not for the 
Reason You Think,” The New Republic, June 11, 2012. https://newrepublic.com/article/103987/the-
supreme-court-has-legitimacy-crisis-not-the-reason-you-think, accessed January 25, 2015. 
6 See Mark Tushnet, “Justification in Constitutional Adjudication: A Comment on 
Constitutional Interpretation,” Texas Law Review 72 (1994), 1707, 1714. 
7 See Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 618 (1840) (Baldwin J., concurring). 
8 Leo Bogart, Polls and the Awareness of Public Opinion (New Brunswick: NJ, 
Communication Books, 1985), 14–15; Mark G. Schmeller, “Imagining Public Opinion in Antebellum 
America: Fear, Credit, Law, and Honor” (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 2001), 3, 11. 
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support. There was no way for the Court to rely on the tacit understanding, based 
on published public opinion polls, that it enjoyed public support. Public opinion 
polls introduced for the first time in history an independent source of evidence, 
considered reliable by all relevant players, of public support for the Court. 
The focus of this article is to explain how the understanding of the concept of 
judicial legitimacy has changed in American constitutional discourse in recent 
decades. This change has two ingredients: first, notions of “public confidence” in 
the Court (or in the scholarly jargon “sociological legitimacy”) became 
synonymous with measurements in public opinion polls; second, the understanding 
of judicial legitimacy in terms of public confidence, rather than in terms of 
justifying the Court’s work based on moral reasons, has become prevalent. 
To demonstrate this change, I begin this article by presenting a comparison 
between Hamilton’s dictum on the judiciary, from The Federalist No. 78, and the 
way Americans currently paraphrase it. I argue that while Hamilton viewed the 
judiciary’s legitimacy in terms of expertise, today he is paraphrased as if he viewed 
the judiciary’s legitimacy in terms of public support. In the third section, I explain 
that the invention of public opinion polls created the conditions for this change in 
the understanding of the concept of judicial legitimacy. At the end of this section, I 
stress that the change in understanding judicial legitimacy does not mean that 
courts have to follow public opinion. A court can understand its legitimacy in 
terms of public support and still follow legal expertise if it believes that such a 
strategy will be beneficial in terms of public support. I demonstrate my argument 
by discussing Chief Justice Roberts’ recent dissenting opinion in Obergefell v. 
Hodges. 
In the fourth section, I discuss the decline in the belief in legal expertise in the 
USA since the New Deal era. This decline is responsible, in part, for viewing 
Hamilton’s dictum on the source of the Court’s legitimacy with disbelief. In order 
to demonstrate that Hamilton’s vision is plausible I explore the example of the 
Federal Reserve Bank and the example of the South African Constitutional Court 
(henceforth: SACC) in its first 10 years of existence. Both examples demonstrate 
that Hamilton’s vision of judicial legitimacy based on expertise is both possible 
and plausible. 
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A sentence in Justice Felix Frankfurter’s dissenting opinion in Baker v. Carr9 is 
arguably the origin of the paraphrasing of Hamilton. In this sentence, Frankfurter 
paraphrases Hamilton but replaces “judgment” with “public confidence.” Before 
concluding, I reveal that Frankfurter kept returning to this sentence in his drafts 
and changing it. I explain that Frankfurter did not identify public confidence in the 
Court with the result of public opinion polls as we do today. 
 
2. The Evolution of The Federalist No. 78 
The concept of legitimacy has several faces. One face is normative, another 
sociological.10 In the context of the institutional legitimacy of courts, according to 
the normative understanding of legitimacy, a court enjoys institutional legitimacy 
as long as its authority can be normatively justified. For example, one may argue 
that the Court’s authority is justified, and hence that the Court has institutional 
legitimacy, as long as it adequately protects human rights that are anchored in the 
Constitution.11 According to the sociological understanding of legitimacy, a court 
enjoys institutional legitimacy as long as the public awards it support over a 
relatively long period of time.12 
While these two meanings of legitimacy are connected, the existence of one 
does not necessarily imply that the other follows. Even if a court’s authority is 
justified (normative legitimacy), it can still lack enduring public support 
                                           
 
9 Baker v. Carr 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962). 
10 See e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “Legitimacy and the Constitution,” Harvard Law Review 
118 (2005), 1787. 
11 See Michael J. Perry, “Protecting Human Rights in a Democracy: What Role for Courts,” 
Wake Forest Law Review 38 (2003), 635, 655–7. 
12 See James L. Gibson and Gregory A. Caldeira, Citizens, Courts, and Confirmations 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 38. 
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(sociological legitimacy).13 The public may have no confidence in a court since it 
misunderstands the court’s judgments, although they can easily be justified 
according to normative standards. Similarly, saying that a court enjoys enduring 
public support does not imply that this support is warranted according to normative 
standards. The public may support a court based on a myth concerning the judges’ 
expert knowledge in solving conflicts of values while in reality judges lack any 
expertise in resolving such conflicts.14 Enduring public support for a court may 
serve, under certain circumstances, as an independent normative justification for its 
authority.15 But most scholars attempt to justify the Court’s authority without 
resorting to public support, since they view the Court’s role in contrasting public 
opinion on certain occasions to be an essential part of its role in a democratic 
system of government.16 
In 1788, Alexander Hamilton famously proclaimed in The Federalist No. 78 
that 
[t]he judiciary on the contrary has no influence over either the sword or the purse. . . . 
It may truly be said to have neither Force nor Will, but merely judgment; and must 
ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its 
judgments.17 
According to Hamilton, the government’s support, essential for the efficacy of the 
Court’s rulings, is acquired because the executive branch acknowledges the value 
of the Court’s judgment and not because it is fearful of public reaction. Even if the 
                                           
 
13 Or Bassok, “The Sociological-Legitimacy Difficulty,” Journal of Law & Politics 26 
(2011), 239, 268–71. 
14 Ibid., 268–70. 
15 Or Bassok and Yoav Dotan, ‘‘Solving the Countermajoritarian Difficulty?,’’ International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 11 (2013), 13. 
16 Mark A. Graber, A New Introduction to American Constitutionalism (New York: Oxford 
University Press 2013), 104–7. 
17 The Federalist No. 78, 392 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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Court makes a judgment that is contrary to popular opinion or to the government’s 
interests, the government will still enforce the judgment, in the same way a patient 
complies with a treatment that causes her pain. Thus, Hamilton based the Court’s 
power “merely” on its judicial expertise; not on public support for the Court.18 
Hamilton’s position represents well the negative view of popular opinion held 
by many of the founders.19 The electoral college system for electing the President 
and the election of two senators per state, regardless of the size of the state’s 
population, are two vivid examples of how the founders designed the Constitution 
to dilute the power of popular will.20 The Court is another example. The founders 
designed the Court to counter shifts in popular opinion that contradicted the 
Constitution.21 In this spirit, Hamilton wrote that “the independence of the judges 
may be an essential safeguard against the effects of occasional ill humors in the 
society.”22 According to this line of thinking, expert knowledge is the tool that 
enables judges to guard the Constitution from public opinion.23 This expertise in 
law is one reason for Hamilton’s objection in The Federalist No. 81 that the final 
appeal in cases will be to the Senate, as the equivalent of the British House of 
Lords. Hamilton explains that judges as “men selected for their knowledge of the 
laws, acquired by long and laborious study” are better equipped to ensure that the 
                                           
 
18 See Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent, 
and Judicial Review (Lawrence KN: University Press of Kansas, 1999), 54. 
19 See for example, Thomas R. Marshall, Public Opinion and the Supreme Court (Boston: 
Unwin Hyman, 1989), 1–2; Daniel A. Farber and Suzanna Sherry, Desperately Seeking Certainty: 
The Misguided Quest for Constitutional Foundations (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 
2002), 86–8. 
20 See Morton J. Horwitz, “The Supreme Court, 1992 Term; Foreword: The Constitution of 
Change: Legal Fundamentality without Fundamentalism,” Harvard Law Review 107 (1993), 30, 58–
9. 
21 Farber and Sherry, Desperately Seeking, 103–4. 
22 The Federalist No. 78, 396. 
23 See Jack N. Rakove, “The Original Justifications for Judicial Independence,” Georgetown 
Law Journal 95 (2007), 1061, 1071. 
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Constitution would not be breached than elected representatives.24 Thus, 
recognizing public support as the source of the Court’s legitimacy would not make 
much sense to the founders. 
 In 2012 Pamela Karlan ends her Harvard Foreword titled “Democracy and 
Disdain” by saying: 
Alexander Hamilton was slightly off base when he wrote that the judiciary has 
“neither Force nor will but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid 
of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.” The judiciary must 
ultimately depend on the people.25 
In other words, Karlan views public support as the Court’s source of legitimacy. 
Even if the Court lacks expertise, as long as it holds public support, it will function 
properly. 
It is not surprising that Karlan views the idea that the Court must have public 
support to function properly as a truism and suggests that Hamilton got it 
(“slightly”) wrong. The idea of a link between public support for the Court and its 
ability to function properly has become so powerful in American constitutional 
discourse that it has become common sense. Most scholars do not even notice, as 
Karlan did, that they are paraphrasing what Hamilton wrote in The Federalist No. 
78 to fit this controlling understanding. They just read Hamilton as confirming the 
controlling paradigm. For example, in their work “On the Legitimacy of National 
High Courts,” social scientists James Gibson, Gregory Caldeira and Vanessa Baird 
write that  
                                           
 
24 The Federalist No. 81, 408 (Alexander Hamilton). See also Rakove, “The Original 
Justifications,” 1070–71. 
25 Pamela S. Karlan, “The Supreme Court, 2011 Term, Foreword: Democracy and Disdain,” 
Harvard Law Review 126 (2012) 1, 71. 
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[n]ot even the most powerful courts in the world have the power of the “purse” or 
“sword”; with limited institutional resources, courts are therefore uncommonly 
dependent upon the goodwill of their constituents for both support and compliance . . . 
courts, more than other political institutions, require a deep reservoir of goodwill.26 
The authors then use public opinion polls to measure that “reservoir of goodwill.” 
In the same spirit, social scientists James Stoutenborough and Donald Haider-
Markel write that  
[l]egitimacy is tied, to a great extent, to the public’s confidence, or specific support, in 
the Court as an institution . . . and without a reservoir of goodwill the Court will 
struggle to maintain its legitimacy.27 
They then refer both to Frankfurter’s sentence from Baker v. Carr noting that 
“Justice Felix Frankfurter may have best summarized the issue” and to The 
Federalist No. 78.28 
For modern American “readers” of Hamilton the crucial question is whether the 
Court holds sociological legitimacy, that is, whether the public supports it. For 
Hamilton, the question was whether the Court has “judgment;” whether it holds 
expertise. This belief in legal expertise was shared by many of the founders.29 
What was it that happened to shift so dramatically the understanding of the Court’s 
source of legitimacy? The invention of public opinion polling was what happened. 
                                           
 
26 James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira and Vanessa A. Baird, “On the Legitimacy of 
National High Courts,” American Political Science Review 92 (1998), 343, 343. See also Richard 
Davis, Justices and Journalists (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 19. 
27 James W. Stoutenborough and Donald P. Haider-Markel, “Public Confidence in the U.S. 
Supreme: A New Look at the Impact of Court Decisions,” The Social Science Journal 45 (2008), 28, 
29 (citations omitted). 
28 Ibid. 
29 See Rakove, “The Original Justifications,” 1068; Bruce Ackerman, The Decline and Fall 
of the American Republic (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 33 
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3. The Effect of the Rise of Public Opinion Polling on 
Understanding Judicial Legitimacy 
Those who hold political power listened to public opinion well before the 
invention of public opinion polls, but the manner in which public opinion is voiced 
has changed. The concept of public opinion appeared already in the eighteenth 
century,30 yet until the invention of scientific public opinion polls, no source of 
data could give direct, regular, and reliable measurements of public opinion, apart 
from elections.31 Between elections, the elected branches were perceived as the 
sole representation of public opinion.32 Moreover, before the introduction of 
opinion polling, “public opinion” was not understood as a simple aggregate of 
individual opinions but more as an “atmosphere” expressed by elites.33 
Scientific public opinion polling was invented in the 1930s.34 After the Gallup 
organization accurately predicted Roosevelt’s 1936 victory in the Presidential 
elections, based on a scientific sample (refuting a magazine’s opposite prediction 
based on a non-scientific poll of more than two million mail ballots), the idea that a 
relatively small scientific sample of public opinion could accurately reflect the 
                                           
 
30 See John Durham Peters, “Historical Tensions in the Concept of Public Opinion,” in 
Theodore L. Glasser and Charles T. Salmon eds., Public Opinion and the Communication of Consent 
(New York: Guilford Press, 1995), 3, 14; John Durham Peters, “Realism in Social Representation and 
the Fate of the Public,” in Slavko Splichal ed., Public Opinion and Democracy Vox Populi-Vox Dei? 
(Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, 2001), 85, 86. 
31 See Robert S. Erikson, Norman R. Luttbeg, and Kent L. Tedin, American Public Opinion: 
Its Origins, Content and Impact, 2nd ed. (New York: Wiley, 1980), 23. 
32 Amy Fried and  Douglas B. Harris, “Governing with the Polls,” The Historian 72 (2010), 
321, 323–24, 353. 
33 See Schmeller, “Imagining Public Opinion,” 3, 11. 
34 See Peters, “Historical Tensions,” 14. 
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public opinion of the entire nation was established in the American public mind.35 
Several decades of constant polling reshaped the term public opinion and it came 
to be synonymous with the results of opinion polls.36 Since the 1980s, almost every 
public issue has been polled and the media devotes a great deal of attention to poll 
results.37 This public opinion culture made opinion polls in the public discourse an 
authoritative indicator of democratic legitimacy.38 
Until the invention of public opinion polls, elected branches’ attacks on the 
Court served as the major informative signal of the Court’s waning public 
support.39 The elected representatives could always claim to hold public support 
for their position, and there was no accepted public indicator to refute their claim 
except on the rare occasions when the Court was an issue in national presidential 
campaigns.40At that period, the view that the government as a whole requires 
public support (rather than individual institutions) was prevalent.41 “[A]ll 
government rest on opinion,” wrote James Madison in The Federalist No. 49,42 but 
the different branches of the regime do not require separate public support. 
                                           
 
35 See James S. Fishkin, The Voice of the People (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1995), 77–8. 
36 George F. Bishop, The Illusion of Public Opinion (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 
2005), 6; Susan Herbst, Numbered Voices: How Opinion Polling Has Shaped American Politics 
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 63; Scott L. Althaus, Collective Preferences in 
Democratic Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 5. 
37 See Bogart, Polls, 15, 21. 
38 See Ackerman, The Decline, 75–6; Sarah E. Igo, The Averaged American (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 12–13, 18–19. 
39 See Jeffery Rosen, The Most Democratic Branch: How the Courts Serve America (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 9; Tom S. Clark, The Limits of Judicial Independence (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), 18–19, 193–94, 251–2, 256–7, 266–7. 
40 See Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial 
Review (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 189–90. 
41 See Owen Fiss, “The Supreme Court, 1978 Term: Forward: The Forms of Justice,” 
Harvard Law Review 93 (1979), 1, 38; Or Bassok, “The Supreme Court’s New Source of 
Legitimacy,” University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 16 (2013), 153, 160.  
42 The Federalist No. 49, 257 (James Madison). 
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Gallup began conducting polls to measure public confidence in the Supreme 
Court as early as the late 1930s, yet it was not until the 1960s that the Gallup and 
Harris organization began to track public support for the Court and its decisions in 
any systematic way.43 The ability to track public support for the Court, the public 
record of this support (often published by popular media), and the scientific allure 
of opinion polls made public confidence in the Court more “real” in the public 
imagination.44 The entrance of public opinion polls as a reliable metric, measuring 
the confidence of the public in the Court and demonstrating it publicly, made it an 
independent criterion of legitimacy.45 It was now possible to view the Court’s 
legitimacy in terms of public support for the first time in history. 
True, long before the invention of public opinion polls, the Court already held 
that it “operates by its influence, by public confidence.”46 The Court was interested 
in public opinion throughout its history, but because of the lack of an accepted 
metric demonstrating public support for the Court, the elected representatives had a 
monopoly on the claim to legitimacy based on public support.47 Even if the Court 
was perceived at some historical periods as the people’s delegate and the justices 
were seen as representatives of the people,48 in any confrontation with the elected 
branches no evidence could confirm the Court’s claim to hold public support. Such 
claims to hold public confidence relied on impressionistic recollections of the 
public mood that were based on letters from the public, media coverage and so 
                                           
 
43 See Thomas R. Marshall, Public Opinion and the Rehnquist Court (Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 2008), 1–2, 29, 77; Gregory A. Caldeira, “Neither the Purse nor the 
Sword: Dynamics of Public Confidence in the Supreme Court,” American Political Science Review 
80 (1986), 1209, 1210–12. 
44 See Fried and Harris, “Governing with the Polls,” 323. 
45 See Bogart, Polls, xxx. 
46 See Holmes, 618; United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 223 (1882). 
47 See Bassok, “The Supreme Court’s New Source,” 156. 
48 See for example, during the early days of the republic, Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of 
the American Republic, 1776–1787 (New York: Norton, 1972), 161. 
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on.49 The Court could not rely on the tacit understanding, following published 
public opinion polls, that it enjoys higher levels of public support than elected 
branches.50 
Between elections, the job of elected representatives was, after all, representing 
public opinion and the climate of opinion they and the media created was 
understood to represent public opinion.51 The question is not only whether public 
representatives and the media presented an accurate picture of public opinion 
before the introduction of scientific polls, but also whether the Court’s legitimacy 
could be understood by the Court and by the other branches as being based on 
public support. Public support for courts, with the exception of rare occasions 
when it is manifested in elections that are focused on court-related issues, is not by 
itself an exercise of power. People with power listen to it.52 Yet, in order for public 
opinion to be listened to, it needs to be measured or to be manifested through 
serious public mobilization. Thus, the Court does not need to state that it holds 
public support, but other institutions need to be aware of a reliable proof 
demonstrating public support for the Court. 
It is hard to pinpoint the exact year in which the understanding of judicial 
legitimacy in terms of public support as expressed in opinion polls rose. In 1959, 
Joseph Menez, a political scientist, published an article titled “A Brief in Support 
                                           
 
49 See Jeff Shesol, Supreme Power: Franklin Roosevelt vs. the Supreme Court (New York: 
W.W. Norton, 2010), 305. 
50 See Ackerman, The Decline, 75. For the situation after the introduction of public opinion 
polls see Barry Friedman, The Will of the People: How Public Opinion Has Influenced the Supreme 
Court and Shaped the Meaning of the Constitution (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009), 15 
(“In this course of acting thus, the Supreme Court has made itself one of the most popular institutions 
in American democracy. The Justices regularly outpoll the Congress and often even the President in 
terms of public support or confidence”). 
51 Fried and Harris, “Governing with the Polls,” 341. 
52 Compare with Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2007), 189–90. 
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of the Supreme Court”.53 Menez began his article by citing Hamilton’s The 
Federalist No. 78, noting “[y]et [the Court’s] judgment is precisely the factor 
which is the cause of the emotional, almost savage furor against it.”54 At another 
point in his article he explains that 
James Bryce saw the futility of popular elections. He perceived that the election of 
judges was an unwise extension of democracy for judges represent the law, not 
constituents. They are not delegates who are politically responsible. The Founding 
Fathers deliberately put the judiciary beyond the reach of the ballot box as well as the 
Gallup Poll.55 
The judiciary today is no longer understood to be out of the reach of public opinion 
polls, which have become the official metric for public opinion. A sign for this 
change can be detected in John Hart Ely’s 1977 Harvard Foreword. Ely attempts to 
show that even without the sword and the purse, the Court is quite powerful. He 
writes that while Hamilton’s The Federalist No. 78 “must have made a good bit of 
sense at the outset of our nation. . . . Time has proven Hamilton’s vision on this 
score badly mistaken.”56 First, he argues that “formal checks,” such as slashing the 
Court’s budget, impeachment, packing the Court and constitutional amendment 
“have surely not proved to be of much consequence.”57 He then moves to discuss 
the fear that the Court will be destroyed by public backlash. Ely dismisses this fear 
noting that 
                                           
 
53 Joseph F. Menez, “A Brief in Support of the Supreme Court,” Northwestern University 
Law Review 54 (1959–1960), 30. 
54 Ibid., 30. 
55 Ibid., 39. 
56 John Hart Ely, “The Supreme Court, 1977 Term: Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental 
Values,” Harvard Law Review 92 (1978), 5, 18–19. 
57 Ibid., 21 
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[t]he warnings probably reached their peak during the Warren years; they were not 
notably heeded, yet nothing resembling destruction materialized. In fact the Court’s 
power continued to grow, and probably has never been higher than it has been over 
the past two decades.58 
In order to prove this last point Ely refers to three sources.59 The third is a news 
report on a “1977 Harris survey that ranked the Court high in public confidence.”60 
The two other sources are law review articles that offer an impressionistic 
assessment of “the prestige”61 and “respect”62 of the Supreme Court. Both articles 
lack any reference to substantiate their assertions and both use tentative phrasing. 
The claims about public support for the Court are more claims about the public’s 
mood than about public support in the aggregate form we are familiar with today. 
When reading these quotes one must bear in mind that they were written during a 
unique period in history; a period in which public opinion polls measuring support 
for the Court had already been introduced but their influence on public discourse 
had just begun.   
During the same years Nathan Glazer wrote that 
[i]n 1975, all evidence suggests that . . . The courts truly have changed their role in 
American life. American courts . . . are now far more powerful than ever before; 
public opinion — which Tocqueville, Bryce and other analysts thought would control 
the courts as well as so much else in American life — is weaker. The legislatures and 
the executive now moderate their outbursts, for apparently outbursts will do no good. 
And courts, through interpretation of the Constitution and the laws, now reach into the 
                                           
 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid., n. 78. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Archibald Cox, “The New Dimensions of Constitutional Adjudication,” Washington Law 
Review 51 (1976), 791, 826–7. 
62 Henry P. Monaghan, “The Supreme Court, 1974 Term: Foreword: Constitutional Common 
Law,” Harvard Law Review 89 (1975), 1, 1–2. 
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lives of the people, against the will of the people, deeper than they ever have in 
American history.63 
The contrast between these three impressionistic assessments of the public attitude 
towards the Court offers a vivid example of why, in any conflict with the elected 
branches the Court was necessarily at a disadvantage in terms of claims of 
legitimacy on the basis of public support until the introduction of public opinion 
polls. Now compare these three quotes with a discussion in 2002 over the claim 
that the Court’s legitimacy was undermined by the decision in Bush v. Gore.64 In 
response to this claim, Erwin Chemerinsky cites the results of a Gallup poll that 
proves that public confidence in the Court did not decline. This proves the point 
that the Court’s legitimacy was not hindered and thus he immediately proceeds to 
offer explanations “[w]hy has there not been the loss in legitimacy that so many 
predicted on December 12.”65  
The introduction of public opinion polls means that impressionistic assessments 
based on scholars’ claims that the Court either has or lacks sociological legitimacy 
are now obsolete. Today, there is an agreed-upon metric.66 Moreover, public 
opinion polls measuring public support for the Court are on many occasions 
published in popular media thus providing public proof available to all of popular 
support for the Court. Subsequently, public support for the Court or the lack of it is 
now considered as a fact and the other branches of government cannot easily 
dispose of it by arguing that they better represent public opinion towards the Court. 
Within several years of its introduction, this new metric, offering a 
straightforward mechanism to measure public attitudes toward the Court, made 
                                           
 
63 Nathan Glazer, “Towards an Imperial Judiciary?,” The Public Interest (1975), 104, 106. 
64 Erwin Chemerinsky, How Should We Think About Bush v. Gore?, Loyola University 
Chicago Law Journal  34 (2002). 
65 Ibid., 3. 
66 See Bogart, Polls, x, 5 
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prevalent in the American discourse the idea that the Court’s legitimacy is to be 
understood in terms of public support, as measured in opinion polls. Scholars 
continuously argue that “judicial power ultimately depended upon popular 
acceptance”67 or that “the Court must take care to behave in a way that inspires or 
maintains public confidence.”68 Rather than emphasizing the difference between 
the Court’s source of legitimacy and that of the elected branches, it is now 
common to argue that “[l]ike the executive and legislative branches, the judiciary 
depends on public support for its legitimacy.”69 
In 2009 Barry Friedman wrote an excellent book titled The Will of the People: 
How Public Opinion Has Influenced the Supreme Court and Shaped the Meaning 
of the Constitution, which retells the entire history of the Supreme Court on the 
premise that in order to function properly the Court requires public support.70 In 
essence, according to Friedman’s account, judicial legitimacy has always been 
understood in terms of public opinion: the only change is that, with time, the 
justices have become better at assessing and maintaining public support.71 While 
public opinion has undoubtedly affected the Court throughout its entire history, the 
introduction of public opinion polls changed the rules of the game with the 
creation of a new understanding of judicial legitimacy.72 
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In his book, Making Our Democracy Work — A Judge’s View, Justice Stephen 
Breyer writes that “[t]he Court itself must help maintain the public’s trust in the 
Court” in order to ensure its proper function.73 Referring to Breyer and Friedman’s 
books, scholars Laurence Tribe and Joshua Matz state in their 2014 book that 
“[l]ike any branch of government, the Court cares deeply about its legitimacy and 
its role in our democratic society.”74 They do not feel the need to note explicitly 
that by relying on these sources they are referring to legitimacy in the sociological 
sense rather than legitimacy in its normative sense. This meaning is now the 
commonsensical or the natural one. 
The availability of this new way to understand judicial legitimacy has affected 
the behavior of representative branches towards the Court as well as the Court’s 
understanding of itself. First, there was a shift in the institutional dynamics 
between the branches of government. The political branches may now enforce the 
Court’s decisions not as a result of its expertise — as if they were the patient doing 
as the doctor ordered — but because of public support for the Court.75 After all, 
between elections, this is the regular pattern of behavior of political players 
towards each other.76 Even when the Court is perceived to act politically that is, 
not according to its expertise, as long as it holds public confidence, political 
resistance to its decisions seems unfeasible. Public opinion is the driving wheel of 
American politics, and no politician wants to stand against it.77 
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Second, justices, both conservatives and progressives, have adopted the idea 
that the Court’s legitimacy relies on public confidence.78 In other words, the 
justices themselves now understand the Court’s legitimacy in sociological terms 
more than ever before. 
 
Table 1.  Understanding Judicial Legitimacy before and after the Introduction of 
Public Opinion Polls 
 
 Why do other branches 
obey the Court? 
In what terms is judicial 
legitimacy mainly 
understood?  
Judicial legitimacy 
according to Hamilton  
 
Judicial expertise Normative  
Revisionist understanding 
of judicial legitimacy  
Public support (as 
measured in public 
opinion polls) 
Sociological  
  
Table 1 summarizes the influence of the introduction of public opinion polls.79 
It is important to stress that I do not argue that after the introduction of opinion 
polls the normative understanding of judicial legitimacy disappeared. Many today 
                                           
 
78 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992) (plurality opinion): “The 
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10, 13. 
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continue to discuss the Court’s legitimacy in normative terms.80 Nor do I deny that 
in the past the Court’s legitimacy was discussed also in sociological terms. Rather, 
I argue that with the introduction of public opinion polls, a new understanding has 
become available and prevalent. 
 Understanding the Court’s legitimacy in terms of enduring public support does 
not mean that the Court has to follow public opinion. Courts can recruit public 
support in various ways.81 For example, there is empirical evidence demonstrating 
that Americans support originalism as a method of interpretation.82 Subsequently, a 
court that adheres to originalism as an interpretative method may enjoy enduring 
public support even if it decides against public opinion. 
In his recent dissenting opinion in Obergefell, Chief Justice Roberts notes that 
“[t]he legitimacy of this Court ultimately rests ‘upon the respect accorded to its 
judgments.’ Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U. S. 765, 793 (2002) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring).”83 Like most American jurists of this generation, 
Roberts adheres to the idea that judicial legitimacy is to be understood in terms of 
public support.84 Yet he continues and explains that legitimacy “flows from the 
perception — and reality — that we exercise humility and restraint in deciding 
cases according to the Constitution and law.”85 In other words, public support 
comes from the Court’s adherence to what I called in a previous article: “thin 
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expertise.”86 Roberts’ approach was best captured by his use of the umpire 
metaphor during his confirmation hearings.87 As he then explained, “[u]mpires 
don’t make the rules, they apply them.”88 
In the second paragraph of his dissenting opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges, 
Chief Justice Roberts stresses that “[u]nder the Constitution, judges have power to 
say what the law is, not what it should be.”89 He then quotes The Federalist No. 78 
in its correct “judgment” form (rather than paraphrasing it). He further writes that 
“[t]he majority’s decision is an act of will, not legal judgment.”90 Roberts is thus a 
good example of a justice who adheres to the understanding of judicial legitimacy 
based on public support and yet states that such support is gained through 
exhibiting legal judgment and not by following public opinion. Roberts gives 
expression to this view at the end of his dissenting opinion writing that “the 
legitimacy of [the judges’] power depends on confining it to the exercise of legal 
judgment.”91 
 
4. Can Constitutional Doctors Exist? 
 
Today, Hamilton’s line of thinking, according to which the Court’s legitimacy is 
based on its expertise, may sound naive to American ears. Perhaps that is why 
Karlan was convinced he was “slightly off”. Ever since the clash between 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Court over New Deal legislation, 
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increased public awareness of the indeterminacy of constitutional norms has 
undermined the public’s belief in the Court’s legal expertise.92 Since the 1930s, the 
public has come to understand that in constitutional cases there is an element of 
choice that cannot be dictated by legal expertise and that the law’s malleability 
allows for political influence over judicial discretion.93 This “discovery” of broad 
judicial discretion in constitutional cases has eroded the public belief that the 
justices hold professional legal expertise that enables them to arrive at the correct 
legal answer.94 The media constantly frame the Court’s judgments as not dictated 
by the law but influenced by the justices’ political alignment.95 It is no surprise, 
then, that the public has come more and more to perceive the Court in recent 
decades as deciding salient cases not solely based on the law, but also according to 
the justices’ own political preferences.96 This evolution in how the American 
public imagines the Court touched the very core of the justices’ claim to legitimacy 
based on legal expertise. 
But what seems naive to Americans regarding the Supreme Court does not 
seem so to them with regard to the Federal Reserve Bank (hereinafter: the Federal 
Bank). The Federal Bank was designed as an institution that offers judgments in its 
realm of expertise and is unaccountable to the public.97At least until recently, it 
was almost undisputed for many decades that the executive complies with the 
Federal Bank’s judgments because of its expertise and not because it holds popular 
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support.98 Why is the American Supreme Court different? What comes to mind 
immediately is that non-compliance with the Federal Reserve’s judgment is like 
refusing to adhere to a doctor’s medical advice.99 But judges seem to be perceived 
differently from economists. At least with regard to salient constitutional cases, 
such as those dealing with the constitutionality of the death penalty, the American 
public’s belief that the justices possess any relevant expertise to decide these 
questions has substantially weakened.100 The Federal Bank and its decisions that 
influence the interest rates are regarded differently. This difference in how 
Americans imagine these two institutions is a result of contingent historical 
developments. Economics is still considered in the USA to be a form of expertise 
to which a separate section is dedicated in newspapers (as opposed to legal issues 
that appear in the general news section). However, after the economic crisis of 
2008, one can easily see beyond this horizon and imagine a world in which the 
salient decisions of the Federal Bank are considered to be as political as the 
Court’s decisions.101 Such a reality existed during the founding era and up to the 
1850s, when economics was not understood as field that can be understood 
according to an autonomous expertise, but as a field that mirrors politics and public 
opinion.102 As Mark Schmeller explains, at that period 
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the causes of economic panics were explained in terms of public opinion. After all, 
antebellum Americans had no theories of business cycles on hand to explain why 
good times suddenly turned hard.103 
The contingent nature of current American disbelief in legal expertise becomes 
evident after reading Theunis Roux’s book on the success of the SACC in its first 
decade of existence.104 As Roux admits, measured by standards of normative 
legitimacy and expertise, the story of SACC in its first 10 years of existence is one 
of great success. However, Roux himself does not view the first 10 years of the 
Court as a complete success since “the Court never built the kind of public support 
that is ordinarily taken to be the mark of a successful constitutional court.”105 
Roux’s book demonstrates that an attempt to apply the new understanding of the 
concept of judicial legitimacy; an understanding created in the American context, 
fails in the South African context. The relevant players still viewed the SACC as 
an expert. Allow me to elaborate on this example.106 
From the outset of his book it is clear that Roux adopted the understanding of 
judicial legitimacy that originates in American constitutional thought according to 
which, in order to function properly, a court must have enduring public support, 
that is, sociological legitimacy. Roux writes that “a certain level of public support 
is a precondition for whatever else a constitutional court may hope to achieve.”107 
The method of assessing public support, along this line of thinking, is polling 
public opinion. In other words, in order to function properly, the SACC needed to 
hold enduring public support as measured in opinion polls. 
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Yet, Roux encountered a problem: the SACC functioned properly without 
possessing enduring public support. Roux could not deny that “the South African 
case appears to defy this rule.”108 Surveys conducted by James Gibson and 
Gregory Caldeira in 1996–1997, 2001 and 2004 showed that the Court never built 
enduring public support.109 These “brute facts about the Chaskalson Court’s 
institutional legitimacy”110 meant that if courts’ legitimacy is determined in 
sociological terms, the SACC lacked legitimacy.  And yet, Roux writes that  
the interesting thing about the Chaskalson Court is that it was able to play its 
constitutionally assigned veto role from the very outset, and that it continued to play 
this role without ever building much institutional legitimacy.111 
While Roux attempts to explain the SACC’s success without abandoning the 
notion that the courts’ legitimacy is measured by the level of enduring public 
support, the account he gives in his book supports Hamilton’s line of thinking. In 
Roux’s narrative the South Africans elite, which consisted mostly of the African 
National Congress party (ANC), believed in judicial expertise even in salient and 
controversial constitutional questions.112 Some of the ANC’s leaders, and in 
particular Nelson Mandela, complied with the SACC’s decisions simply because 
they believed in its expertise even when the SACC ruled against their interests.113 
Even with rifts inside the ANC during the Mbeki presidency, and the ensuing 
decline of strategic reasons by part of the ANC leadership to support the Court, 
“very few attacks on the Court were in fact launched, and none that could be 
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described as successful.”114 The belief in the SACC’s expertise was not necessarily 
a belief only in judicial expertise in legal doctrine (though that existed as well.115). 
Rather, as Roux explains, the ANC obeyed the Court during the Chaskalson era 
out of a commitment to human rights and because the Court was perceived as an 
expert in human rights.116 
The success of the SACC in the first 10 years of its existence is explained better 
by Hamilton’s understanding of the judiciary’s basis of legitimacy than by the 
current revisionist understanding. As Roux himself admits: 
[T]he Court was continually able to defy the ordinary assumptions of liberal 
constitutional theory by exploiting the ANC’s dominance to carve out a role for itself 
as an independent check on the abuse of political power.117 
As long as the executive branch is persuaded by the expertise of the national high 
court and the system of governance as a whole possesses public confidence, public 
support for the national high court as a distinct institution is not crucial for its 
proper function. Understanding the concept of legitimacy in the way that Hamilton 
did in The Federalist No. 78 is not a form of naivety. 
 
5. From Public Deference to Public Acknowledgment to Public 
Confidence 
 
In Baker v. Carr118 the Court held that voters whose franchise is diluted by the 
discriminatory apportionment of legislative seats may seek relief in federal courts 
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rather than be rejected based on justiciability grounds. This was the first time the 
Court held that legislative districting presented a justiciable controversy.119 Baker 
v. Carr was the first step in the Court’s attempt to eliminate population inequalities 
in political representation and to truly fulfill the promise of “one person, one 
vote.”120 Justice Frankfurter’s dissenting opinion offers an argument about the 
proper role of the judiciary in the political process. In his view, courts do not offer 
solutions to the ills of population inequality in the context of political 
representation. He concluded that the case posed a political question and was thus 
nonjusticiable, and that the public should rely on their representatives to provide 
relief.121 Frankfurter puts special emphasis on the concern that judicial supervision 
of democratic politics would hinder the Court’s legitimacy.122 My focus here is 
only on Frankfurter’s vision of judicial legitimacy which is the basis of his 
analysis. 
Frankfurter describes the Court’s source of legitimacy in the following words: 
“The Court’s authority — possessed of neither the purse nor the sword — 
ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction.”123 
Researching earlier drafts of this opinion brings to light two other versions 
Frankfurter considered. (I have marked the changes between the two versions of 
the sentence appearing in the drafts and the final version in italics.) The first 
version of this sentence appears in a 1962 January draft: “The Court’s power 
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ultimately rests in sustained public deference to its moral authority.124 On a draft 
dated February 1962, this sentence was changed and the second version reads: 
“The Court’s power — possessed neither of the purse nor the sword — ultimately 
rests on sustained public acknowledgment of its moral authority.” 125 
The implied reference to The Federalist No. 78 in adding “the purse” and “the 
sword,” and the replacement of “deference” with “acknowledgement” were made 
together in handwriting in the margins of the printed text of the February draft. 
Although he does not explicitly refer to The Federalist No. 78 (as he does at other 
points in his opinion when he refers to The Federalist No. 54, 56 and 62126) it is 
hard to imagine that when he inserted the reference to the sword and the purse, 
Frankfurter was unaware that he was paraphrasing Hamilton. Frankfurter referred 
to The Federalist Papers as “a lawyer’s brief by the framers of the Constitution in 
support of their handiwork,”127 and was second in the Court only to Justice 
Douglas in the amount of explicit references he made in his opinions to The 
Federalist Papers.128 
While only the second version of this sentence clearly resembles The Federalist 
No. 78, in all of the versions the idea that the Court’s power or authority ultimately 
rests on the public, rather than on judgment, remains constant. However, the 
public’s required state of mind changes from “deference” to “acknowledgment” to 
“confidence.” The trend is clear — the level of required public affinity for the 
Court increases. It is not enough for the public to merely acquiesce to the Court’s 
                                           
 
124 Felix Frankfurter, Draft Baker Dissent, January, 1962, at 5. (available at The Felix 
Frankfurter Papers, Part II, ProQuest electronic database). 
125 Felix Frankfurter, Draft Baker Dissent, February, 1962, at 5. 
126 Baker v. Carr 369 U.S. 186, 303  and n.  62, 308–309 and n. 62, 74, 75. 
127 William O. Douglas, “The Lawyer and the Public Service,” American Bar Association 
Journal 26 (1940), 633, 635 (quoting Justice Frankfurter). 
128 James G. Wilson, “The Most Sacred Text: The Supreme Court’s Use of The Federalist 
Papers,” Brigham Young University Law Review (1985), 65, 66 and n. 5. 
  
 
28 
 
 
 
moral authority, nor is it enough that it would recognize the Court’s moral 
authority. The public needs to trust the Court’s moral sanction. 
Baker v. Carr was not the first time Frankfurter spoke of the Court’s authority 
as being dependent on public confidence.129 Yet we should refrain from 
anachronism. In many current public opinion polls the measure of public support 
for the Court is public confidence.130 However, in 1962, public opinion polls had 
just begun to make their mark on the understanding of the Court’s source of 
legitimacy. For example, Frankfurter’s former clerk Alexander Bickel wrote in his 
1962 book The Least Dangerous Branch,131 “[m]ost assuredly, no democracy 
operates by taking continuous nose counts on the broad range of daily 
governmental activities.”132 As this quote shows, Bickel was not oblivious to the 
new polling technology. Yet he still did not fully realize its effects on the Court 
when he formulated the counter-majoritarian difficulty as the problem of an 
unaccountable Court rather than the difficulty of a judicial institution that is 
unresponsive to public opinion as expressed in opinion polls.133 
The meaning of public opinion for Frankfurter was very different than ours. 
Public opinion was not yet synonymous with public opinion polls since public 
opinion polls had yet to acquire their current status.134 Frankfurter was well aware 
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of the development of opinion polling. For example, in his correspondence with 
Walter Lippmann, who wrote several important books on public opinion, 
Frankfurter spoke of “polls mischief” and regarded the idea of forming public 
policy by consulting Gallup polls as a great mistake.135 In the context of judicial 
legitimacy, polls measuring public support for the Court were not yet frequent. For 
these reasons, it is a misreading to understand the sentence in Baker v. Carr as 
suggesting that, even without the sword or the purse, the Court can stand on its 
own feet facing the other branches of government based on its public support as 
measured in public opinion polls. Frankfurter’s dissenting opinion, let us not 
forget, calls for a retreat of the Court from the political domain. 
For Frankfurter public opinion was more an atmosphere created by the media 
and not a simple aggregate of individual opinions.136  His close friend, Walter 
Lippmann expressed this understanding when he described public opinion as a 
“phantom” of the media or elite opinion, projected in order to legitimatize the 
views of the elite.137 Frankfurter envisioned a tripartite structure of American 
society in which experts communicate their knowledge to the elite that is charged 
with educating the mass public.138 Legal historian Brad Snyder explains that 
Frankfurter shared “Jefferson’s faith in the democratic political process and 
enlightened public opinion.”139 Throughout his article, Snyder continues to use the 
term “enlightened public opinion” when he discusses Frankfurter’s views.140 He 
notes that “The Flag Salute Cases, Brown and its progeny, and Baker v. Carr 
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highlight Frankfurter’s Jeffersonian faith in enlightened public opinion.”141 Since 
Frankfurter attributed to the concept of public opinion a meaning that is different 
from the one we currently attribute to it, adding the term enlightened is required in 
order to avoid anachronism. 
Only by viewing public opinion as enlightened public opinion can we reconcile 
Frankfurter’s strong belief in expertise with his strong belief in democracy.142 
Frankfurter never believed that the Court, an expert in law, should follow public 
opinion. In his dissent in West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette (1943) he 
emphasized that “[t]he Court has no reason for existence if it merely reflects the 
pressures of the day”143 and in Dennis v. U.S. (1951) Frankfurter stressed that 
“[c]ourts are not representative bodies. They are not designed to be a good reflex 
of a democratic society.”144 Yet, although Frankfurter was a great believer in legal 
expertise,145 he did not support justices weighing in on every public issue. There 
are other experts in other fields and besides, the final word belongs to the 
enlightened public. The Court as an expert needs to “be on tap, but never on 
top.”146 
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Table 2. Frankfurter’s View on Judicial Legitimacy   
 Why do other branches 
obey the Court? 
In what terms is judicial 
legitimacy mainly 
understood?  
Frankfurter’s position Enlightened public 
confidence 
Normative 
 
 
In comparison to Frankfurter’s quotes cited above, in Baker v. Carr Frankfurter 
adds a twist: the confidence is in the Court’s “moral sanction.” Frankfurter’s 
sentence presents the idea that the Court would receive the confidence of the 
enlightened public as long as its authority enjoyed moral justification. In Table 1 
presented earlier, Frankfurter’s position is an intermediate one (see Table 2).  
 According to Frankfurter’s view, an argument that has normative legitimacy 
will necessarily gain the support of the enlightened public. In his tripartite 
structure, the elite would necessarily be convinced by the expert who presents 
valid arguments, and the mass public would be educated to support the correct 
position. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The concept of judicial legitimacy has been changing. It is not easy to detect the 
change since the names of the concepts we are using — legitimacy, public opinion 
— have remained the same. As I have shown, one way to detect the change is by 
following how The Federalist No. 78 is paraphrased by contemporary jurists, 
usually without the jurist even noticing the change in its meaning. 
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Our understanding of basic concepts such as legitimacy usually changes very 
slowly. Relatively rapid shifts sometimes occur as the result of a technological 
innovation. Since technological innovation destabilizes the social context in which 
language acquires meaning, concepts used in technological environments different 
from our own may have drastically different meanings. Take, for example, the shift 
in how we understand the word “smart” today in comparison to Biblical times.147 
The Bible tells us that King Solomon was considered the smartest of all people, 
because (among other things) “he uttered 3,000 proverbs.”148 This was how an oral 
society, in which memory had the utmost importance, imagined what it meant to 
be smart. Today, with internet sites holding tens of thousands of proverbs, a man 
like Solomon, who offers a proverb for every situation, would surely not be 
considered the smartest of all. The meaning of the word smart was altered as a 
result of technological innovations. 
The introduction of public opinion polls had a similar effect. In the USA, the 
understanding of public opinion is currently so inseparable from the results of 
public opinion polls that the idea of sociological legitimacy has become 
synonymous with public support as manifested in public opinion polls.149 
Furthermore, I have shown that in recent decades the availability of opinion polls 
measuring public support for the Court, together with the dominance of the public 
opinion culture and the decline in the belief in legal expertise have made this form 
of legitimacy more prevalent in understanding the concept of judicial legitimacy. 
Chief Justice Roberts’ reliance in Obergefell v. Hodges on The Federalist No. 
78 famous dictum on judicial legitimacy and his use of Justice Kennedy’s 
paraphrase of the same dictum demonstrate how this basic issue is still at the center 
of the Court’s adjudication. And yet, with all the focus on this topic, the change in 
                                           
 
147 See Neil Postman, Amusing Ourselves to Death (New York: Penguin Books, 1986), 25. 
148 1 Kings 5:10–12. 
149 See Bogart, Polls, xxix. 
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understanding the concept of judicial legitimacy resulting from the introduction of 
public opinion polls has been concealed from our eyes. 
  
  
 
